SENTENCING-NEW

JERSEY CRIMINAL JUSTICE CODE REQUIRES

v. Hodge,
95 N.J. 369, 471 A.2d 389 (1984); State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334,
471 A.2d 370 (1984).
THAT PUNISHMENT FIT CRIME, NOT CRIMINAL-State

On August 10, 1978, the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice was enacted.' The Code represents the Legislature's first attempt to deal directly with the problem of disparity in
sentencing.2 It classifies offenses into four degrees of crime 3 and
two grades of disorderly persons offenses 4 and supplies a set of
statutory sentencing presumptions for each. 5 This structure of
classifications and presumptions provides a rigid framework to
6
guide the exercise of judicial discretion in imposing sentences.
In two recent decisions, State v. Roth7 and State v. Hodge,8 the New
Jersey Supreme Court insisted upon strict adherence to the
Code's sentencing guidelines and rejected any exercise of discretion beyond the statutory bounds. 9
On September 11, 1980, James Hodge was indicted by a
Middlesex County grand jury and charged with two counts of aggravated sexual assault and one count of endangering the welfare
of a child.' 0 Following his indictment, Hodge admitted that, for
one year, he had engaged in sexual activity with his thirteen year
old stepdaughter." At the time of his sentencing, Hodge was
I See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:1-1 to 98-4 (West 1982).
2 State v. Maguire, 84 N.J. 508, 532, 423 A.2d 294, 307 (1980).
3 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-4.

4 Id. § 2C:43-1.
5 See id. § 2C:44-1(d), (e). Subsection (d) provides that the court shall imprison

a person convicted of a crime of the first or second degree "unless, having regard
to the character and condition of the defendant, it is of the opinion that his impris-

onment would be a serious injustice which overrides the need to deter such conduct by others." Id. § 2C:44-1(d). Subsection (e) provides that the court shall not

imprison a person convicted of an offense other than a crime of the first or second
degree, who has no prior convictions, "unless, having regard to the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history, character and condition of the defendant, it is of the opinion that his imprisonment is necessary for the protection of the
public." Id. § 2C:44-1(e). The presumptive sentence for first degree crimes is 15

years, for second degree crimes seven years, for third degree crimes four years, and
for fourth degree crimes nine months. Id. § 2C:44-1(f)(l).
6 State v. Maguire, 84 N.J. 508, 532, 423 A.2d 294, 307 (1980).

7 95 N.J. 334, 471 A.2d 370 (1984).
8 95 N.J. 369, 471 A.2d 389 (1984).
9 Hodge, 95 N.J. at 379-80, 471 A.2d at 395; Roth, 95 N.J. at 365, 471 A.2d at

387.

10 Brief and Appendix on Behalf of Defendant-Respondent at 1, State v. Hodge,
95 N.J. 369, 471 A.2d 389 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Respondent].
"t

Hodge, 95 N.J. at 371, 471 A.2d at 390.
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thirty-four years old, had no prior criminal record, and had been
employed as a warehouseman by the General Services Administration for approximately twelve years.' 2 He had also served a
combat tour of duty with the armed forces in Vietnam.' 3 He lived
in his own home with his wife and their natural daughter.' 4
Hodge pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated sexual assault, 15 in return for which the state agreed to recommend dismissal of all other counts.' 6 The probation department's
presentence report recommended that, in view of the victim's
youth, Hodge be sentenced to a term of imprisonment despite
his status as a first offender.' 7 The trial court sentenced him to
sixty-three days in prison and five years' conditional probation,
and imposed fines totalling $2525. ' 8 The state appealed, claiming that the sentence was excessively lenient.' 9
The appellate division, in a divided opinion, affirmed the
judgment of the trial court. 20 The majority held that appellate
interference with the trial court's sentencing function was appropriate only when the sentence so shocked the court's conscience
as to convince it " 'that upholding the action reviewed would be
manifestly unjust.'- 21 The dissent asserted that incarceration
would be more appropriate, given the severity of the crime, and
that the trial court had misapplied the aggravating and mitigating
factors.2 2
The state filed a notice of appeal from the judgment of the
appellate division. 23 Hodge filed a petition for certification, chal12

Brief for Respondent, supra note 10, at 3.

13 Id.
14

Id.

15 Hodge, 95 N.J. at 371, 471 A.2d at 390.

Brief for Respondent, supra note 10, at 1.
Hodge, 95 N.J. at 372, 471 A.2d at 390-91.
18 Id. Probation was conditioned upon a directive to undergo psychiatric care.
Id.
19 Letter Brief on Behalf of Plaintiff-Appellant at 3, State v. Hodge, 95 N.J. 369,
471 A.2d 389 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant]. The state appealed
pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1(f)(2), which provides that "ifthe court imposes a non-custodial or probationary sentence upon conviction for a crime of the
first or second degree, such sentence shall not become final for 10 days in order to
permit the appeal of such sentence by the prosecution." Id.
20 See Hodge, 95 N.J. at 372, 471 A.2d at 391.
21 See id. (quoting State v. Whitaker, 79 N.J. 503, 514, 401 A.2d 509, 514
(1979)).
22 See id. at 373, 471 A.2d at 391. The dissenting judge believed that the presence of mitigating factors might have justified a sentence for a crime one degree
lower than that of conviction. See id.
23 Brief for Appellant, supra note 19, at 1. The state's appeal was as of right by
16
17
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lenging the state's right to appeal from a sentencing decision.24
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted Hodge's petition,2 5 reversed the appellate division's order, and remanded the matter to
the trial court for re-sentencing.2 6 It held that the sentencing
court had relied improperly on pre-Code guidelines and had exercised its discretion in a manner prohibited under the Code.2 7
On June 28, 1982, Henry Michael Roth approached and
stopped a young mother strolling her child on a street in
Cranford, New Jersey.28 He threatened her with a knife and
forced her under an overpass.2

9

The woman pleaded with Roth

not to harm her or her child." Fearing injury, the victim was
forced to perform a sexual act upon Roth. 3 The infant, sleeping
in the carriage, was not injured. 2 Prior to the assault, Roth had
been drinking and had ingested half a quaalude. 3 The following
day, Roth began to drink once again and consumed another
quaalude. 4 During the early morning hours of the next day, he
set fire to a factory while attempting to burglarize the building.35
After reporting the fire, he returned to the scene; he was arrested
later that day.36
Following a suicide attempt in the Union County Jail, Roth
was transferred to the Trenton Psychiatric Hospital for observavirtue of the dissent in the appellate division. N.J. CT. R. 2:3-1(a) (Pressler ed.
1985).
24 Hodge, 95 N.J. at 373, 471 A.2d at 391.
25 94 N.J. 517, 468 A.2d 176 (1983).
26 Hodge, 95 N.J. at 380, 471 A.2d at 395.
27 Id. at 378-80, 471 A.2d at 394-95.
28 Roth, 95 N.J. at 340, 471 A.2d at 373.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.; Statement of Reasons Pursuant to R. 3:29 at 1, State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334,
471 A.2d 370 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Statement of Reasons]. The trial court
noted a "strong thread of consideration" throughout the incident. Id. Roth had
accepted the victim's explanation or excuse of inability to have intercourse, displayed a concern to avoid the misplacement or damage of her eyeglasses, and tendered an apology to the victim before leaving the scene. Id.
33 Roth, 95 N.J. at 341, 471 A.2d at 373.
34 Brief on Behalf of Defendant-Respondent at 6, State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334,
471 A.2d 370 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Defendant].
35 Id. Roth was on temporary leave as a third-class petty officer, stationed on the
U.S.S. Saratoga, which was temporarily drydocked at the Philadelphia Naval Yard.
His attempt to burglarize the factory followed his realization that he did not have
the money to purchase a return train ticket to Philadelphia. After entry of his guilty
plea, but before sentencing, Mr. Roth was honorably discharged from the United
States Navy. Id. at 5.
36 Id. at 6.
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tion.37 Tests performed there revealed a severe alcohol dependence and a drug abuse problem. 3s Roth was returned to jail but
was later released on bond to the Alcohol Unit of the John E.
Runnells Hospital.3 9 As a condition of bail, he was required to
complete a twenty-one day in-patient alcohol rehabilitation
program.4 o
On July 21, 1982, a Union County grand jury returned an
indictment charging Roth with aggravated sexual assault, a first
degree crime.4 ' A second Union County grand jury indicted him
on charges of aggravated arson, a second degree crime, and arson, a third degree crime.4 2 He entered pleas of guilty to the aggravated sexual assault and third degree arson charges.4 3 The
trial court ordered Roth to submit to a psychiatric examination at
the Avenel Adult Diagnostic Treatment Center. 44 The Center did
not find any evidence of compulsive psychosexual behavior and
reported that Roth did not qualify for treatment under the sex
offenders' disposition provisions of the Code.4 5 It was, however,
recommended by the Runnells Hospital Alcoholic Rehabilitation
Unit, the defense psychiatrist, and the Trenton Psychiatric Hospital that Roth receive extensive in-patient treatment for his substance abuse. 46 The presentence report included more than
thirty letters from community members urging that Roth not be
imprisoned and asserting that the sole cause of his conduct was
his long term abuse of alcohol and drugs.4 7
The trial court weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors according to what it termed "the standard sentencing criteId.
Roth, 95 N.J. at 340, 471 A.2d at 373.
39 Brief for Defendant, supra note 34, at 6.
40 Id. At the time of his release to the hospital program, Roth had been confined
for a total of 66 days. Id.
41 Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division - Union County Criminal Indictment No. 1211-81, State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 471 A.2d 370 (1984). The indictment also charged Roth with robbery, a first degree crime, possession of a weapon
for an unlawful purpose, a third degree crime, and unlawful possession of a
weapon, a crime of the fourth degree. Id. The threatened use of a weapon made
the sexual offense a crime of the first degree. Roth, 95 N.J. at 340, 471 A.2d at 373;
see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2(a)(4).
42 Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division - Union County Criminal Indictment No. 1212-81, State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 471 A.2d 370 (1984).
43 Brief for Defendant, supra note 34, at 1. In return for this plea, the State
agreed to recommend dismissal of all other charges. Id.
44 Roth, 95 N.J. at 340, 471 A.2d at 373.
45 Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:47-1 to -3).
46 Id. at 341, 471 A.2d at 373.
47 Id.
37
38
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ria' 48 and sentenced Roth to five years' probation on both
charges. 4' The state appealed the sentence5 ° and the New Jersey
Supreme Court directly certified the case. 5 ' The supreme court
determined that the trial court had failed to apply the Code's sentencing guidelines.5 2 Analyzing the record, the court concluded
that the sentencing court had improperly relied upon traditional
sentencing principles embodied in the state's pre-Code case
law. 5' The court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the matter for sentencing in accordance with the mandates of the Code.5 4
The Code's sentencing guidelines are based on a set of sentencing presumptions. 55 The use of those presumptions has resulted in a two-step sentencing process in which the discretionary
authority of the trial court is statutorily guided. The Code requires that a judge first determine whether a custodial, a noncustodial, or a probationary sentence should be ordered. 56 A presumption of imprisonment, however, is provided for persons
convicted of first or second degree crimes.5 7 In such cases, a sen48 Id. at 366-67, 471 A.2d at 388. The trial court found as aggravating factors
that "the crime was committed in a cruel manner, the victim was substantially incapable of exercising normal physical resistance," and there was a need for deterrence. Statement of Reasons, supra note 32, at 2-3. The mitigating factors included
Roth's "willingness to cooperate with law enforcement authorities, his drug and
alcohol problems, a prior law-abiding life, and the likelihood that Roth would respond affirmatively to probationary treatment." Id. at 1-2.
49 Roth, 95 N.J. at 341, 471 A.2d at 373. The probationary sentence included

special conditions. Roth was to enter and complete an in-patient rehabilitation
program with monthly progress reports sent to the probation department. Brief
for Defendant, supra note 34, at 2. Upon completion of this program, he was to
continue treatment as an out-patient. Such treatment was to include programs designated by probation, such as Alcoholics Anonymous. He was to pay $40 per week
restitution to be remitted to the arson victim's insurance carrier. These payments,
however, were not required during the in-patient treatment program. Id.
50 See Roth, 95 N.J. at 341,471 A.2d at 373. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1(f)(2),
which permits the state to appeal if a non-custodial sentence is imposed upon a
defendant convicted of a first or second degree crime.
51 State v. Roth, 94 N.J. 622, 468 A.2d 249 (1984).
52 Roth, 95 N.J. at 366, 471 A.2d at 388.
53 Id. (citing State v. Whitaker, 79 N.J. 503, 401 A.2d 509 (1979); State v. Leggeadrini, 75 N.J. 150, 380 A.2d 1112 (1977); State v. Ivan, 33 N.J. 197, 162 A.2d
851 (1960)).
54 Id. at 369, 471 A.2d at 389.
55 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1(d), (e).
56 Id. The Roth court referred to this initial determination as the "in or out"
decision. Roth, 95 N.J. at 368, 471 A.2d at 389.
57 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1(d). There is a presumption of non-imprisonment
for persons convicted of an offense other than a crime of the first or second degree.
Id. § 2C:44-1(e).
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tencing court may order a non-custodial sentence only if it finds
that "imprisonment would be a serious injustice which overrides
the need to deter such conduct by others." 58 The Code provides
the state with the right to appeal from non-custodial sentences
that have been ordered according to such findings. 59 The second
step of the sentencing process requires a court that has decided
to incarcerate to fix the length of the defendant's sentence.6 ° In
this regard, the Code establishes a permissible range of
sentences for each degree of crime. 6 ' Within each classification
there is a presumptive sentence.62 After examining the aggravating63 and mitigating 64 factors set out in the Code, the sentencing
court may adjust the presumptive sentence within the permissible
range.6 5 If the mitigating factors greatly outweigh the aggravating ones, the court may sentence a defendant to a term of imprisonment that is specified for a crime one degree lower than that of
which he has been convicted.6 6 Once again, the Code provides
the state with a right to appeal from the imposition of such a
reduced sentence.67
The incorporation of discretionary exercises in the Code's
sentencing guidelines has led to some confusion among trial and
appellate courts attempting to reconcile the mandates of the
Code with those principles that traditionally have guided courts
in the exercise of their sentencing discretion.68 In the past, the
determination of an appropriate sentence required a judge to
Id. § 2C:44-1(d).
§ 2C:44-1(f)(2).
60 The court is expected to impose the presumptive sentence unless its examination and weighing of the aggravating and mitigating factors justifies an adjustment
within the statutory range. See Roth, 95 NJ. at 359, 471 A.2d at 384.
58

59 Id.

61

N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 2C:43-6(a).

Id. § 2C:44-1(f)(1). The presumptive sentence for first degree crimes is 15
years, for second degree crimes, seven years, for third degree crimes, four years,
and for fourth degree crimes, nine months. Id. A presumptive sentence represents
the middle ground between the statutory minimum and maximum established for
each degree of crime in New Jersey. Id. § 2C:43-6(a).
63 Id. § 2C:44-l(a). The statute lists nine aggravating factors which focus on the
nature and circumstances of the offense, the seriousness of the harm inflicted, the
risk of recurrence, the defendant's prior criminal record, and the need for deterrence. Id.
64 Id. § 2C:44-1(b). The Code sets forth 13 mitigating factors, including the absence of serious harm, grounds tending to excuse defendant's conduct, the victim's
conduct, a prior law-abiding life, the unlikelihood of recurrence, defendant's rehabilitative potential, and the hardship entailed by imprisonment. Id.
65 See Roth, 95 N.J. at 359, 471 A.2d at 384.
66 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1(f)(2).
62

67

Id.

68 See Hodge, 95 NJ. at 379, 471 A.2d at 395. The few years following the Code's
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weigh the need for individual justice and fairness against the
need for deterrence, which served society's demand for uniform
justice. 69 That balancing process required the sentencing judge
to consider a seemingly infinite number of offender and offenserelated facts. 70 Consideration of those facts was founded in "the
belief that by careful study of the lives and personalities of convicted offenders many could be less severely punished and re7
stored sooner to complete freedom and useful citizenship." 1
In State v. Ivan, 72 the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected retribution as a philosophical justification for punishment, and focused instead on the objectives of deterrence and rehabilitation
in a sentencing scheme.73 According to the court, an emphasis
on those factors was consistent with the view that "punishment
should fit the offender as well as the offense."' 74 In considering
both the offender and the offense, the courts concentrated on the
quality of the conduct underlying the crime.7 5 The Ivan court
identified two major types of crimes and the appropriate factors
to be emphasized when meting out punishment for each. 76 The
first type of crime was described as an isolated event motivated
by strong emotional pressures and "unassociated with a pressing
public problem."' 77 The second involved calculated crimes found
to be "part of a widespread criminal skein."' 78 A crime of the first
type would allow a sentencing judge to place greater emphasis
adoption have been marked by a period of adjustment, resulting at times in a confusion of philosophies. Id.
69 See State ex rel. C.A.H., 89 N.J. 326, 336, 446 A.2d 93, 98 (1982); State v. Ivan,
33 N.J. 197, 200-01, 162 A.2d 851, 852-53 (1960); see also Shepard v. United States,
257 F.2d 293, 294 (6th Cir. 1958) (convicted criminal's surest measure of justice
lies in fairness of sentence received).
70 See State v.Jones, 66 N.J. 563, 568, 334 A.2d 20, 22 (1975). The court in Jones
listed the following factors that a judge should consider in fixing a sentence: "the
gravity of the crime and appropriate punishment therefor, deterrence, protection
of the public, rehabilitation and any other factors or circumstances relevant to the
particular situation." Id.
71 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 249 (1949). According to the Williams
Court, "retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of jurisprudence." Id. at 248. But see von Hirsch, Recent Trends in American Sentencing Theory, 42
MD. L. REV. 6, 13 (1983) (rehabilitation should not be used as basis for sentence
choice).
72 33 N.J. 197, 162 A.2d 851 (1960).
73 Id. at 199-200, 162 A.2d at 852.
74 Id. at 200, 162 A.2d at 852 (citations omitted).
75 State ex rel. C.A.H., 89 N.J. 326, 336, 446 A.2d 93, 98 (1982).
76 Ivan, 33 N.J. at 202, 162 A.2d at 853.
77 Id.
78 Id.
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upon the circumstances of the individual offender, whereas the
second type would require greater concern
for the magnitude of
79
others.
deter
to
need
the
and
the crime
The use of deterrence as a penal tool varies according to the
crime and the offender involved in the particular situation. 80 For
example, in State v. Velazquez,81 the appellate division upheld a
one to two year prison term that had been imposed for involvement in a lottery business. 82 The defendant, a first time offender,
was the father of six and helped to support his mother; he had
been steadily employed for nearly twenty years, and played an
active role in community and church affairs.8 Judge Gaulkin, dissenting, felt that such strict punishment had been imposed because of Velazquez's failure to implicate others.84 Moreover, in
the dissent's opinion, the sentencing court did not give sufficient
weight to the defendant's prior good record or to the impact that
the sentence would have on him or his family. 85 Velazquez's sen-

tence was summarily affirmed by the supreme court,8 6 with the
concurrence noting that in the "absence of a clear showing of
abuse of discretion," a sentencing determination could not be
disturbed on appeal.8 7
By contrast, in State v. Harris,88 the supreme court vacated a
condition of restitution imposed upon a mother of five who was
convicted of "welfare fraud," deeming the "human cost of such
deterrence" to be too great. 89 The court's decision arose out of

its consideration of the individual offender and her value to society as a conscientious mother struggling to sustain five children. 90 The foregoing cases illustrate that a court's consideration
79 Id.
80 Stateexrel. C.A.H.,

89 N.J. 326, 335, 446 A.2d 93, 97-98 (1982). The doctrine
of deterrence includes both "individual deterrence" - that punishment will discourage the offender from repeating his criminal acts-and "general deterrence"
- that punishment will be a vicarious penal lesson to other similarly disposed persons. Id. at 334-35, 446 A.2d at 98.
81 104 N.J. Super. 578, 250 A.2d 771 (App. Div.), affd, 54 N.J. 493, 257 A.2d
440 (1969).
82 See id. at 579, 250 A.2d at 772.
83 Id. at 583-84, 250 A.2d at 774 (Gaulkin, SJ., dissenting in part).
84 Id. at 581-84, 250 A.2d at 773-74 (Gaulkin, S.J., dissenting in part).
85 Id.
86 State v. Velazquez, 54 N.J. 493, 257 A.2d 440 (1969) (per curiam).
87 Id. at 495, 257 A.2d at 441 (1969) (Jacobs, J., concurring).
88 70 N.J. 586, 362 A.2d 32 (1976).
89 Id. at 596-97, 362 A.2d at 88. The presentence report showed that the offender was the sole parent in the household, was employed on a full-time basis, and
was a hard working conscientious woman. Id. at 595, 362 A.2d at 36-37.
90 Id.
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of the seriousness of the offense, the need for deterrence, and
the human costs of punishment can lead to disparate results in
categorically similar situations.
The use of deterrence as an objective of punishment for
crimes with "strong emotional roots" has also been problematic. 9 ' In State v. Leggeadrini,92 a sixty-six year old man with no
prior criminal record shot and killed his twenty-six year old
neighbor following a heated dispute over the victim's ballplaying
activities near the defendant's front yard.93 The sentencing court
recognized a diminished need for individual deterrence due to
the minimal likelihood that such a "once in a lifetime" act would
be repeated.9 4 Nevertheless, the court ordered the defendant imprisoned for a term of twenty-five to thirty years, 95 stating that
the seriousness of the harm and the need for general deterrence
warranted substantial punishment. 96 The appellate division af97
firmed the sentence.

The supreme court, in reversing, concluded that a less severe sentence would adequately serve the objective of deterrence, without discrediting the criminal law or depreciating the
seriousness of the offense. 98 The court reasoned that the goal of
deterring future crime is not advanced by imposing severe
sentences for crimes committed in emotion-laden
circumstances. 9 9

The perceived need to deter future criminal conduct also has
been tempered by the court's recognition of rehabilitation as a
91 Ivan, 33 N.J. at 202, 162 A.2d at 853. This is a crime of the first type described in Ivan. See supra text accompanying note 77.
92 75 N.J. 150, 380 A.2d 1112 (1977).
93 Leggeadrini, 75 N.J. at 153-54, 380 A.2d at 1114. The presentence report
showed that the offender, Leggeadrini, was a stable member of the community who
enjoyed a secure family life. Id. at 154, 380 A.2d at 1114-15. Prior to his retirement
in 1972, he had been continuously employed at the same job for 34 years. There
were allegations that the victim had made abusive remarks to Leggeadrini's wife
prior to Leggeadrini's involvement in the argument. Id.
94 See id. at 155, 380 A.2d at 1115.
95 See id. at 153, 380 A.2d at 1114. Under the then-existing statute, the permissible range of punishment for the crime was anywhere from 30 years imprisonment
to an unspecified minimum. Id. at 158, 380 A.2d at 1117; see N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A: 113-4 (West 1969), repealed by id. § 2C:11-2 (West 1982).
96 See Leggeadrini, 75 N.J. at 155, 380 A.2d at 1115.
97 See id. at 153, 380 A.2d at 1114.
98 Id. at 163, 380 A.2d at 1119.
99 Id. at 162, 380 A.2d at 1119. The court reduced the offender's sentence to a
term of imprisonment for a minimum of seven years and a maximum of 10 years.
Id.
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primary sentencing objective. In State v. Bess, 100 an eighteen year
old bartender shot and killed an unruly patron following a dispute over the price of a drink.' The defendant immediately
summoned the police and fully cooperated with the investigation. 02 He was subsequently convicted of second degree murder
and sentenced to a prison term of not less than ten nor more
than fifteen years. 10 3 In reducing the sentence, the New Jersey
Supreme Court observed that the defendant was a fit subject for
rehabilitation and reasoned that the degree of his moral culpability had been mitigated by facts contained in a favorable
presentence report.10 4 The court concluded that the objectives of
the state's penal policy - prevention of crime and rehabilitation
0 5
of criminals-would be served by modification of the sentence.1
In State v. Whitehead,'° 6 the NewJersey Supreme Court found
rehabilitation to be a subsidiary objective of sentencing and relied upon the necessity of punishment and deterrence in affirming a sentence of eleven to twenty-two years in state prison
for a young offender convicted of second degree murder.'0 7 The
supreme court agreed with the trial court's emphasis on the heinous nature of the crime, which the trial judge had characterized
as a "virtual execution," in concluding that rehabilitation must
yield to deterrence. 10 8
100 53 N.J. 10, 247 A.2d 669 (1968).
101 Id. at 13-14, 247 A.2d at 670-71.
102 Id. at 14, 247 A.2d at 671.
103 Id. at 13, 247 A.2d at 670. The permissible sentences for crimes of this caliber ranged from no minimum requirement to 30 years' imprisonment. See N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:113-4 (West 1969), repealed by id. § 2C:11-2 (West 1982).
104 Bess, 53 N.J. at 19, 247 A.2d at 673-74. The presentence report showed that
the offender was a good citizen with a strong family background and no prior criminal record. Id.
105 Id. The court reduced the sentence from a term of not less than 10 nor more
than 15 years' imprisonment to a term of not less than two nor more than five
years' imprisonment. Id.
106 80 N.J. 343, 403 A.2d 884 (1979).
107 Id. at 349-50, 403 A.2d at 888. The sentencing judge had recommended that
the offender serve his sentence at the Youth Correctional Institution Complex at
Yardville. Id. at 350, 403 A.2d at 888; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-85 (West 1981)
(youthful offenders with minimum terms may be transferred to the Youth Complex
to serve their prison sentence); id. § 30:4-146 to -148 (offenders less than 26 years
old at time of sentencing may be sentenced to indeterminate term at youth correctional institution complex); cf. State v. Des Marets, 92 N.J. 62, 71, 455 A.2d 1074,
1078 (1983) (indeterminate sentencing to youth correctional facility primary means
of accomplishing rehabilitation).
108 Whitehead, 80 N.J. at 349-50, 403 A.2d at 888. Although the crime was his first
offense as an adult, the offender had a substantial record as a juvenile and was
under probationary supervision at the time of the offense. State v. Whitehead, 159
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The conflict between deterrence and rehabilitation as sentencing objectives has been particularly evident in the treatment
In State ex rel. C.A.H.," the supreme court
of young offenders.'
dealt with the proper application of New Jersey's juvenile waiver
statute,"' which requires the judge to balance the separate, but
l 2
related, goals of public protection and juvenile rehabilitation."
The court held that the statutory goal of protecting society includes consideration of deterrence and punishment, as well as
physical security.' 13 The court observed that deterrence in the
juvenile waiver context serves the same purpose as it does in the
sentencing of adjudicated offenders - discouragement of future
offenses through punishment.' 14 In the juvenile waiver setting,
the need for deterrence was held to be related directly to the severity of the offense and the deliberateness of the offender's
acts." 5 Consequently, in balancing the need for deterrence
N.J. Super. 433, 435, 388 A.2d 280, 281 (Law Div. 1978), afd, 80 N.J. 343, 403
A.2d 884 (1979).
109 See State v. Des Marets, 92 N.J. 62, 455 A.2d 1074 (1983) (Graves Act mandates three year minimum state prison term for those using or possessing a firearm
during commission of specified offenses; trial court may not sentence young offender to indeterminate term at youth correctional facility). But cf. State ex rel.
C.A.H., 89 N.J. 326, 336, 446 A.2d 93, 98 (1982) (rehabilitation through reformation and education traditionally played key role in treatment of young offenders in
NewJersey); In re Lewis, 11 N.J. 217, 94 A.2d 328 (1953) (statutory policy for treatment of juvenile offenders directed to rehabilitation not punishment).
The use of rehabilitation has existed in the United States since the late nineteenth century. von Hirsch, Utilitarian Sentencing Resuscitated: The American Bar Association's Second Report on Criminal Sentencing, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 772, 772 (1981).
Rehabilitation derived its theoretical roots from a "positive" jurisprudence of criminal sentencing. According to positivist doctrine, the quantum of sentence should
depend on the offender's future behavior, his need for treatment, and the likelihood of his committing future crimes. The gravity of his conduct was given only
slight consideration. Id. But cf. von Hirsch, supra note 71, at 7-13 (prediction methods utilized to determine whether and how long offender should be imprisoned
demonstrated disturbing incidence of "false positives," that is, persons mistakenly
predicted to be recidivists).
110 89 N.J. 326, 446 A.2d 93 (1982).
''I Id. See 1973 N.J. Laws ch. 306, § 7, repealedby 1982 N.J. LAws ch.77, § 33, (eff.
Dec. 31, 1983) (current version at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-26 (West Cum. Supp.
1984-1985)).
112 State ex rel. C.A.H., 89 N.J. at 328, 446 A.2d at 94. The statute required that
two successive determinations be made. The first was whether there was a realistic
prospect for rehabilitation by the time the juvenile would reach the age of 21. If
such a realistic prospect existed, the judge then determined whether the need for
deterrence in the given case outweighed the evidence in favor of rehabilitation. Id.
at 332, 446 A.2d at 96.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 337, 446 A.2d at 99.
115 Id. Factors favoring deterrence and waiver include the commission of a grave
offense, the deliberateness of such conduct, the advanced age of the offender, a
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against the prospects for rehabilitation, the court recognized that
"the gravity of the crime, perhaps the most obvious and potent
factor in favor of deterrence, may serve to' 16overcome problematic
or debatable evidence of rehabilitation." "
In evaluating the need for rehabilitation or deterrence in a
particular case, sentencing judges have in the past been required7
to consider myriad factors before rendering final disposition."1
Within this context, only limited standards for assessing the validity of a sentencing decision have been provided. Appellate
deference to the discretionary decisions of sentencing courts has
been compared to the deference accorded the decisions of a trier
of fact." 8 Thus, the presumed superior ability of the trial judge
to evaluate the character of the offender in relation to the offense' has tempered appellate review of sentencing decisions.
Such review generally is confined to a reading of the record to
determine whether the facts contained therein support the trial
120
court's statement of reasons for its sentencing decision.
Although appellate courts traditionally have been authorized
to review criminal sentences, New Jersey courts have not always
had the power to revise a sentence. 12 1 During the late nineteenth
century, a reviewing court could only alter a sentence which it
found to be manifestly illegal. 122 The appellate court, however,
could neither pronounce a proper sentence nor remand the case
past record of infractions, and a background of delinquency and exposure to the
juvenile justice system. Id. at 345, 446 A.2d at 103.
116 Id.
117 See supra note 70 for a list of these factors.
118 See Leggeadrini, 75 N.J. at 162, 380 A.2d at 1118.
119 Id; see M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES 82-83 (1973) (trial judge has unreproducible advantage of seeing defendant and "sizing him up"); cf. State v. Kunz,
55 N.J. 128, 132, 259 A.2d 895, 897 (1969) (presentence reports originally sought
to tailor sentence to background and present circumstances of offender along with
nature of offense).
120 Leggeadrini, 75 N.J. at 161, 380 A.2d at 1118 (appellate court does not conduct
de novo exercise of sentencing function). Sentencing judges are required to set forth
the findings and reasons for sentences imposed. N.J. CT. R. 3:21-4(e), 7:4-6(c)
(Pressler ed. 1985). The principal purpose of the "reasons" rule is to aid appellate
evaluation of the judge's discretionary determination. State v. Whitaker, 79 N.J.
503, 512, 401 A.2d 509, 514 (1979). The goal of meaningful review on appeal is
not served if the reasons stated are routine or "boilerplate." Id. at 508, 401 A.2d at
511; cf.id. at 512, 401 A.2d at 514 (similar duty imposed upon NewJersey appellate
courts when reducing sentence where the law provides for further appellate review
of their action).
121 Roop v. State, 58 N.J.L. 487 (Sup. Ct. 1895); State v. Gray, 37 N.J.L. 368
(Sup. Ct. 1875).
122 State v. Gray, 37 N.J.L. 368, 372 (Sup. Ct. 1875).
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for correction.12 3 Declarations of manifest illegality, therefore,
resulted in a reversal of the judgment and a discharge of the offender. 124 Even after the state's appellate courts were granted
statutory authority to correct erroneous sentences,1 2 5 the grant
was construed as applying only where the sentence was manifestly illegal.1 26 This construction led to acceptance of the rule
that a sentence was not ordinarily reviewable where it fell within
statutory limits. 127
In more recent years, the New Jersey Supreme Court has
considered the power to review sentences to be an inherent aspect of the statutory authority to sentence. In 1957, in State v.
Culver, 1 28 the supreme court held that the trial court's power to
punish criminal offenders included the power to correct
sentences.1 29 The court reasoned that where an illegal sentence
was imposed, the sentencing court retained its jurisdiction until
that sentence was corrected.1 30 Four years later, in State v. Johnson,"' the appellate division characterized the doctrine of nonreviewability as a "product of the technicalities of the day" 13 2 and
asserted that the only existing rationale against such review was
based on "historical assumptions and meagre precedent." 133 The
court concluded that a reviewing court had the power to revise a
sentence which, although within statutory limits, was "manifestly
excessive." 1 34 This power of review was expressly acknowledged
35
by the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Bess.'
The power to correct an excessive sentence does not, howRoop v. State, 58 N.J.L. 487, 488 (Sup. Ct. 1895).
State v. Gray, 37 N.J.L. 368, 372 (Sup. Ct. 1875).
See 1898 N.J. Laws ch. 237, § 144.
State v. Johnson, 67 N.J. Super. 414, 427, 170 A.2d 830, 837 (App. Div.
1961).
127 See State v. Schmelz, 17 N.J. 227, 238, 111 A.2d 50, 57 (1955); State v. Benes,
16 N.J. 389, 396, 108 A.2d 846, 849 (1954); In re Lewis, 11 N.J. 217, 224, 94 A.2d
328, 332 (1953).
128 23 N.J. 495, 129 A.2d 715 (1957).
129 Id. at 504, 129 A.2d at 720.
130 Id. at 511, 129 A.2d at 724.
131 67 N.J. Super. 414, 170 A.2d 830 (App. Div. 1961).
132 Id. at 426, 170 A.2d at 837; see also State v. Mull, 30 N.J. 231, 239, 152 A.2d
572, 577 (1959) (collection of authorities indicating erosion in' "doctrine of
nonreviewability").
133 Johnson, 67 N.J. Super. at 427, 170 A.2d at 837.
134 Id. at 432, 170 A.2d at 840.
135 53 N.J. 10, 18, 247 A.2d 669, 673 (1968). The court noted that "[i]t is well
settled in this state that an appellate court has the power to review any exercise of
the trial court's discretion, including the power to revise a prison sentence where it
is manifestly excessive, even though within statutory limits." Id. (citations omitted).
123
124
125
126
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ever, authorize the appellate court to conduct a de novo exercise
of the sentencing function. 3 6 Although a trial court's findings
are not impregnable, appellate judges have been urged to resist
the natural temptation to substitute their own judgment for that
of the trial judge. 3 7 The standard of review that has been applied
by the New Jersey courts has required a "clear showing of abuse
of discretion."''

31

In State v. Whitaker,139 the supreme court at-

tempted to sharpen this standard through incorporation of the
rule applied in civil cases.' 4 ' The civil rule prohibits a trial judge
or an appellate court from interfering with a jury's fixing of damages unless the award is so disproportionate to the injury proved
as to shock the court's conscience and lead the court to the belief
that, if sustained, it would result in a manifest injustice.14 The
Whitaker court reasoned that the strictures upon appellate supervision in the civil arena were keyed to a "clear and compelling"
determination that a particular finding represented a "miscarriage of justice."' 142 The court concluded that these civil restraints should be applied to the review of a criminal trial court's
136 Leggeadrini, 75 N.J. at 161, 380 A.2d at 1118. An appellate tribunal's review of
the sentence before it is dependent upon the record. This dependence has encouraged appellate deference for those findings of trial judges " 'which are substantially influenced by his or her opportunity to hear and see witnesses.' " State v.
Whitaker, 79 NJ. 503, 515, 401 A.2d 509, 515 (1979) (quoting State v.Johnson, 42
N.J. 146, 161, 199 A.2d 809, 817 (1964)).
137 State v. Whitaker, 79 N.J. 503, 513, 401 A.2d 509, 514 (1979).
138 State v. Velazquez, 54 N.J. 493, 495, 257 A.2d 97, 98 (1969); State v. Tyson,
43 N.J. 411, 417, 204 A.2d 864, 867 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 987 (1965). An
"abuse of discretion" may be demonstrated by the imposition of a sentence which
is manifestly excessive under the particular circumstances of the case. Leggeadrini,
75 N.J. at 157, 380 A.2d at 1116. For example, in State v. Bender, 80 N.J. 84, 402
A.2d 217 (1979), the court defined an abuse of discretion in the context of a prosecutor's decision to reject an application for pretrial intervention. In order to prevail, a defendant must show that "a prosecutorial veto (a) was not based upon a
consideration of all relevant factors, (b) was based upon a consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or (c) amounted to a clear error in judgment." Bender,
80 N.J. at 93, 402 A.2d at 222.
139 79 N.J. 503, 401 A.2d 509 (1979).
140 Id. at 513, 401 A.2d at 514. The court considered its task particularly important in light of a marked increase in appeals from allegedly excessive sentences.
This need has become even more evident given the state's right to appeal certain
sentences under the new Code. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1(f)(2).
141 Whitaker, 79 N.J. at 513, 401 A.2d at 514. In a civil case, where the only contested issue concerns the appropriateness of the jury's damage award, the techniques of additur and remittitur are favored. See N.J. CT. R. 4:49-1 comment
(Pressler ed. 1985); see also Taweel v. Starn's Shoprite Supermarket, 58 N.J. 227,
276 A.2d 861 (1971) (remittitur device denies defendant's application for new trial
on condition that plaintiff consent to specified reduction in jury's award).
142 Whitaker, 79 N.J. at 514, 401 A.2d at 514; accord N.J. CT. R. 4:49-1 (Pressler ed.
1985).
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exercise of discretion in sentencing. 4 3 Although announced in
cases challenging allegedly excessive sentences, these principles
also have been applied to 44appeals by the state from sentences
considered overly lenient. 1

In Roth, the supreme court expressed its view that the New
Jersey Code of Criminal Justice "established an entirely new sentencing process." 45 The court observed that the Code's reforms
were intended to foster uniformity in sentencing through elimination of the practically unfettered discretion formerly exercised
by trial courts. 146 Recognizing the Code's " 'clean break with the
past,' '147 the court reasoned that the "philosophies and
processes of the past," which focused on the blameworthiness of
the offender, could not coexist
with the Code, which focuses on
148
offense.
the
of
the gravity
The Roth court focused primarily on the Code's presumption
of imprisonment 149 and its presumptive sentences. 150 Writing for
a unanimous court, Justice O'Hern observed that the sentencing
judge had improperly balanced the presumption of imprisonment against a preponderance of mitigating factors, rather than
against the single factor of "serious injustice" set out in the
Code.'' Thus, the supreme court held that a sentence of impris143 Whitaker, 79 N.J. at 516, 401 A.2d at 516; accord Leggeadrini, 75 N.J. at 162, 380
A.2d at 1118.
144 See, e.g., State v. Gerstofer, 191 N.J. Super. 542, 545, 468 A.2d 436, 438 (App.
Div. 1983).
145 Roth, 95 N.J. at 340, 471 A.2d at 372-73.
146 Id. at 345, 471 A.2d at 375.
147 Id. at 369, 471 A.2d at 389 (quoting State v. Butler, 89 N.J. 220, 226, 445
A.2d 399, 402 (1982)).
148 Id. The court demonstrated the overall thrust of the new Code with statistics
of recent prison sentences. In 1979, 42% of all convictions resulted in prison
terms. Three years later, in 1982, 51% of all sentences resulted in prison terms. In
1982, 40% of state prison terms included periods of parole ineligibility. In addition, 96% of those offenders convicted of first degree crimes during 1982 were
imprisoned, including 8976 of those convicted of aggravatedsexual assault. Id. at 355, 471
A.2d at 382.
149 See id. at 356, 471 A.2d at 382. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1(d), which provides that
[t]he court shall deal with a person who has been convicted of a crime of
the first or second degree by imposing a sentence of imprisonment unless, having regard to the character and condition of the defendant, it is
of the opinion that his imprisonment would be a serious injustice which
overrides the need to deter such conduct by others.
Id.
150 Roth, 95 N.J. at 356, 471 A.2d at 382. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1(f)(1) for
a list of presumptive sentences.
151 Roth, 95 N.J. at 366, 471 A.2d at 388. The lower court, in rejecting a prison
sentence, and imposing a non-custodial sentence, had asserted that
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onment can be withheld only when a court " 'having regard to
the character and condition of the defendant' believes that incarceration would be a 'serious injustice which overrides the need to
deter such conduct by others.' ",152 The focus15of
the Code, there3
fore, falls almost exclusively on the offense.
Critical to the court's decision was its determination that the
Code's authorized dispositions were not self-executing. 154
1 55
Although courts are authorized to order suspended sentences,
they can do so only after thorough consideration of the criteria
set out in chapter forty-four of the Code. 156 Thus, a sentencing
1 57
court must first consider the presumption of imprisonment.
The Roth court viewed this presumption as a restrictive guide
limiting a sentencing judge's discretion in dealing with a particular crime and criminal. 158 The court, however, determined that
the presumption was not absolute and that the trial courts retained "a residuum of power"
not to incarcerate where it would
1 59
be entirely inappropriate.

The court held that the residuum of power could be exercised only where imprisonment would be so unjust that it overrides the need for general deterrence. 60 Such a standard can
only be met in exceptional cases with " 'truly extraordinary and
there is no program within our institutions which can meet the defendant's special needs. He is now a fit candidate under court rule for treatment at a facility outside the prison system, where his further efforts
could be treated and evaluated. The court recognizes the need to punish and deter, but is satisfied, based on the history and character of the
defendant, the nature and circumstances of the crimes, the risk defendant presents, [and] the lack of special institutional facilities requires the
following sentence be imposed.
Id. at 367, 471 A.2d at 388.
152 Id. at 368, 471 A.2d at 389 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1(d)).
153 See id. at 367, 471 A.2d at 388. The court observed that a sexual assault upon
a woman walking her child on a city street is the kind of offense the Legislature had
in mind when it created the presumption of imprisonment. Id. at 367-68, 471 A.2d
at 388. A sexual crime committed with the use of a weapon is a crime of the first
degree, the highest degree of crime in the Code with the exception of murder. See
id. at 368, 471 A.2d at 388-89.
154 See id. at 357, 471 A.2d at 383.
155 Id.; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-2(b).
156 See Roth, 95 N.J. at 357, 471 A.2d at 383.
157 Id.; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1(d). This determination is sometimes described as the "in or out" decision. See supra notes 55 & 56 and accompanying text.
158 See Roth, 95 N.J. at 358, 471 A.2d at 383.
159 Id.
160 Id.
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unanticipated circumstances.' "161 Trial courts unable to find
such an injustice must impose a custodial sentence. 16 2 Once imprisonment is ordered, the trial court must consider the Code's
63
presumptive sentence. 1
In setting the length of sentence, a trial court's discretion is
limited by the Code."6 The Roth court stated that any adjustment
of a presumptive sentence must begin with an examination of the
Code's aggravating and mitigating factors.' 6 5 It acknowledged
that a preponderance of aggravating factors would permit imposition of a sentence up to the statutory maximum, whereas a preponderance of mitigating factors would allow imposition of the
statutory minimum sentence. 166 A trial court also has the statutory authority to impose the sentence applicable to a crime one
degree lower than that of conviction, when it is "clearly convinced" both that the mitigating factors "substantially outweigh"
the aggravating factors and that the interests of justice demand
reduction. 1 67 If, applying the same standards, an opposite relationship among these factors exists, the court is authorized to order a period of parole ineligibility.' 68 The court's reasons for
modifying the presumptive sentence must be clearly set forth in
its written "statement of reasons" for its disposition of the
69
case. 1
After discussing the trial court's role in sentencing, the Roth
170
court addressed the state's right to appeal a criminal sentence.
The Code permits such appeals in two separate instances. 171
First, it provides the right to appeal when the defendant has been
sentenced to a term of imprisonment which is appropriate for a
crime one degree lower than that of his conviction. 1 72 Second,
161 Id. (quoting Fair and Certain Punishment, Report of the Twentieth Century
Fund Task Force on Criminal Sentencing 21 (1976)).
162 Id. at 358-59, 471 A.2d at 383.
163 See id. at 359, 471 A.2d at 383.
164 See id.; 471 A.2d at 383-84 (citing NJ. STAT. ANN. § 44-1(f)(1)).
165 Id., 471 A.2d at 384 cf supra notes 63 & 64 (outlining aggravating and mitigating factors).
166 Roth, 95 NJ. at 359, 471 A.2d at 384. The statutory ranges for each degree of
crime are as follows: first degree - 10 to 20 years; second degree - five to 10
years; third degree - three to five years; fourth degree - a term up to but not
exceeding 18 months. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a).
167 Roth, 95 NJ. at 359, 471 A.2d at 384 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1(f)(2)).
168
169
170
171
172

Id. (citing N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 2C:43-6(b).

Id. at 360, 471 A.2d at 384 (citing NJ. CT. R. 3:21-4, 3:29 (Pressler ed. 1984)).
See id. at 360-66, 471 A.2d at 384-87.
See id. at 360, 471 A.2d at 384.

See id. (citing NJ.

STAT. ANN.

§ 2C:44-1(f)(2)).
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the right is granted in those cases in which the trial court has
exercised its residuum of discretion and ordered a non-custodial
or probationary term for a defendant convicted of a first or second degree crime.' 7 3 After determining that such appeals do not
violate the double jeopardy provisions of the New Jersey Constitution,' 7 4 the court focused on the standard of review it deemed
appropriate to guide appellate courts. 7 5 In this context, the
court expressed its intention to give content to the "clear abuse
of discretion" standard. 7 6
The court outlined a three-pronged test to be applied by appellate courts when they review sentencing decisions. 177 The first
prong requires that "an exercise of discretion be based upon
findings of fact that are grounded in competent, reasonably credible evidence."' 17' Thus, an appellate court must conduct a "review [of] the aggravating and mitigating factors found below, to
determine whether those factors were based upon competent
credible evidence in the record."'' 79 The court's second prong requires that a factfinder apply correct legal principles when exercising its limited discretionary function. 180 Appellate courts,
See id.
Id. at 343-45, 471 A.2d 374-75. The court rejected Roth's contention that
such an appeal would be unconstitutional under the Double Jeopardy Clauses of
the N.J. CONST. art. I, and the U.S. CONST. amend. V. See Roth, 95 N.J. at 343, 471
A.2d at 374. The court stated that it had consistently followed the principles of the
Federal double jeopardy clause because of its broader language. Id. at 344, 471
A.2d at 375. The New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged its freedom to "construe [New Jersey] State constitutional provisions more expansively than the
Supreme Court construes the corresponding federal provisions," but concluded
that there did not exist any peculiarly local considerations which would justify giving our narrower state constitution's double jeopardy clause a broader reading. Id.
at 344-45, 471 A.2d at 375; cf. State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982)
(warrantless seizure of toll billing records violated N.J. CONST. art. I, even though
Supreme Court had impliedly excluded such records from fourth amendment
protection).
175 See Roth, 95 N.J. at 363-66, 471 A.2d at 386-87. The Code provides that
[any action taken by the Court in imposing sentence shall be subject to
review by an appellate court. The court shall specifically have the authority to review findings of fact by the sentencing court in support of its
findings of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and to modify the
defendant's sentence upon his application where such findings are not
fairly supported on the record before the trial court.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-7.
176 Roth, 95 N.J. at 363, 471 A.2d at 386.
177 Id. at 363-64, 471 A.2d at 386.
178 Id. at 363, 471 A.2d at 386 (citing State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162, 199
A.2d 809, 817-18 (1964)).
179 Id. at 364, 471 A.2d at 387.
180 Id. at 363, 471 A.2d at 386.
1'73

174
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therefore, must determine whether the correct sentencing guidelines and presumptions have been followed.' Finally, under the
third prong, an appellate court may modify a sentence only when
it is convinced that "the [trial court's] application of the facts to
the law [constitutes] such a clear error ofjudgment that it shocks
the judicial conscience." 182
183
The court decided Hodge on the same day it decided Roth.
Hodge, however, presented the court with an issue not present in
Roth. By amendment, effective in September 1981, the New
Jersey Legislature had redefined the Code's presumption of im8 4
prisonment to encompass all first and second degree crimes.1
Although sentenced after the effective date of the amendment,
Hodge's criminal activity took place prior to the enactment of the
new provision.185 The statute under which Hodge had been
charged did not include a presumption of imprisonment. 186 Because the prior statutory language was unclear, the court held
that the 1981 amendment should not be applied retroactively in
Hodge's case. 187
181 Id. at 365, 471 A.2d at 387.
182 Id. at 364, 471 A.2d at 386 (citing State v. Whitaker, 79 N.J. 503, 512, 401
A.2d 509, 514 (1979)).
183 The offender, James Hodge, had also pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault, a crime of the first degree. Compare Hodge, 95 N.J. at 371, 471 A.2d at 390,
with Roth, 95 N.J. at 340, 471 A.2d at 373.
184 See Hodge, 95 N.J. at 373, 471 A.2d at 391. The prior provision read:
d. Presumption of Imprisonment. Where a statute defining a crime of the
first degree provides that a presumption of imprisonment shall be applied upon conviction or where a statute outside the code defining an offense which would be a
crime of thefirst or second degree under the code provides for a mandatory sentence,
a presumption of imprisonmentshall apply. The court shall deal with a person
who has been convicted of such a crime by imposing a sentence of imprisonment unless, having regard to the character and condition of the
defendant, it is of the opinion that his imprisonment would be a serious
injustice which overrides the need to deter such conduct by others.
Id. (quoting 1979 N.J. Laws ch. 290, § 93, repealedby 1981 N.J. Laws ch. 290, § 40)
(emphasis added).
185 See id. Case law bearing on the problem of ex post facto penalties has always
identified the date the crime was committed as being the key factor in determining
whether penal legislation or court rulings have retroactive effects. See State v.
Johns, 111 N.J. Super. 574, 577, 270 A.2d 59, 60 (App. Div. 1970), certif. denied, 60
N.J. 467, 291 A.2d 17, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1026 (1972).
186 See Hodge, 95 N.J. at 373, 471 A.2d at 391; see also State v. Morgan, 196 N.J.
Super. 1, 4, 481 A.2d 545, 546 (App. Div. 1984) (Hodge ruling clearly illustrates
principle that there is no presumption of incarceration for second degree crimes
committed before Code's 1981 amendment).
187 Id. at 374, 471 A.2d at 392. The court held that "[s]tatutes rendering behavior criminal and fixing the applicable penalties must do so in terms that cannot
arguably be misunderstood and must be construed 'so as to avoid the unfairness of
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Despite its decision not to apply the 1981 amendment in the
case before it, the court reiterated its opinion that a reviewing
court must determine whether the correct sentencing guidelines
have been followed. 88 The Hodge court determined that the record below did not disclose the required "inexorable focus" on
the gravity of the offense. 189 Instead, the trial court had concentrated on the character of the defendant. 9 ' The Hodge court thus
concluded that the trial court had followed pre-Code sentencing
guidelines.' 9 ' Consequently, under the Code's offense-oriented
analysis, the court held that "the severity of the crime is now the
'
single most important factor in the sentencing process." 192
The opinion, written by Justice O'Hern, re-emphasized the
proper role of the aggravating and mitigating factors in the
Code's sentencing process.' 93 The court held that consideration
of those factors bears only on the length of the sentence imposed
and on the decision to downgrade a sentence or to impose a period of parole ineligibility.' 94 The court reasoned that the strict
limitations placed on exercises of sentencing discretion in those
areas evidenced an intent on the part of the Legislature to demand even stricter control over the "in or out" decision. 195 Thus,
the "in or out" decision is unaffected by any consideration of aggravating or mitigating factors, and, where provided, the presumption of imprisonment cannot be overcome by a
preponderance of mitigating factors.' 96
arbitrary enforcement.' " Id. (quoting State v. Maguire, 84 N.J. 508, 514 n.6, 423
A.2d 294, 297 n.6 (1980)).
188 Id. at 376, 471 A.2d at 393. This determination forms the second prong of
the three-pronged test for appellate review which was outlined in Roth. See supra
text accompanying notes 178-82.
189 Hodge, 95 N.J. at 376, 471 A.2d at 393.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 378, 471 A.2d at 394.
192 Id. at 378-79, 471 A.2d at 394. The court noted the difficulty faced by the
Legislature in crafting and grading individual offenses. It stated that such an effort
should be respected, particularly "its premise - the fundamental sentencing
guideline that the punishment fit the crime, not the criminal." Id. at 376, 471 A.2d
at 392 (emphasis added).
193 Id. at 376-77, 471 A.2d at 393-94; see supra notes 164-68 and accompanying
text.
194 Hodge, 95 N.J. at 377, 471 A.2d at 394.
195 Id. at 376, 471 A.2d at 393. The Code requires that the court be "clearly
convinced" that the aggravating and mitigating factors "substantially outweigh"
each other before downgrading a sentence or imposing a period of parole ineligiblity. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:44-1(f)(2), :43-6(b)).
196

See Roth, 95 N.J. at 366, 471 A.2d at 388 (presumption of incarceration must

be balanced against single factor of "serious injustice" as Code requires).
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Justice O'Hern observed that "there is no calculus that will
guide the pen to the perfect sentence."' 9 7 The court commented
that the tragic sentencing disparity that existed under prior law
must not be forgotten.'
Justice O'Hern acknowledged that
although any sentencing system will have its imperfections, the
Code provides hope for "a principled, evenhanded, effective, and
fair law of sentencing.',' 9 9
The pre-Code processes were unable to achieve any semblance of uniformity in sentencing. 0 0 Cognizant of that failure,
the Legislature enacted the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice,
which created an "entirely new sentencing process. ' 20 1 In acknowledging the Code's displacement of prior sentencing standards and its restrictions on the exercise of judicial discretion,
the court, in Roth and Hodge, effectuated the goal of the Legisla22
ture: sentencing uniformity.
In Roth, the court observed that "the Code requires an inexorable focus upon the offense when formulating a sentence."203
The sentencing provisions of the Code are based on a "just
deserts" model of criminal sentencing.2 0 4 The just deserts model
prescribes punishment in proportion to the seriousness of the
conduct which society has designated as wrongful.2 0 5 Unlike
other traditional sentencing models, the just deserts model focuses on past conduct and does not seek to justify its sanctions
through their prospective usefulness in preventing crime.2 0 6 The
Code's sentencing provisions thus attempt to tailor criminal
sanctions to the offense committed rather than to the characteris197
198

Hodge, 95 N.J. at 379, 471 A.2d at 395.

Id.

Id. at 380, 471 A.2d at 395.
200 Roth, 95 N.J. at 369, 471 A.2d at 389.
201 See id. at 340, 471 A.2d at 372-73.
202 See id. at 369, 471 A.2d at 389; Hodge, 95 N.J. at 379-80, 471 A.2d at 395.
203 Roth, 95 N.J. at 367, 471 A.2d at 388.
204 See id. at 354-55, 471 A.2d at 381-82. See generally Raymar, Criminal Dispositions
for New Jersey: PretrialIntervention, the Model Penal Code, andJust Deserts, 8 SETON HALL
L. REV. 1 (1976).
205 Raymar, supra note 204, at 2 n.8. The early origins of this theory lay in Immanuel Kant's philosophy that an offender should be punished when he deserves it,
'99

because he deserves it, and to a degree directly related to the gravity of the offense.
Id. at 37.
20, Id. at 38 (citing A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 46 (1976)). The traditional

purposes of criminal sentencing have included retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation. See State v. Ivan, 33 N.J. 197, 199, 162 A.2d 851, 852
(1960). Traditionally, legislatures have provided little or no guidance as to which

purposes are primary or how conflicts among the purposes are to be resolved. See
Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 443 n.16 (1981) (citation omitted).
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tics of the offender. 2°7 Although the Code's presumptive
sentences are based on the gravity of the criminal conduct involved, they do allow for modest deviations based on an examination and weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors. 20 8
This "modified deserts" model synthesizes just deserts and preventive considerations while retaining its primary focus on the
severity of the crime.20 9
The court's opinions in both Roth and Hodge provide a detailed articulation of the standards that guide sentencing and reviewing courts under the Code. Consideration of aggravating
and mitigating factors provides sentencing courts with the discretion to adjust presumptive sentences.2 10 These factors can also
be used to downgrade a sentence or to impose a period of parole
ineligibility. 2 1' Ultimately, however, these discretionary exercises
are strictly limited by statute. 21 2 Thus, a trial court can only adjust a presumptive sentence within the statutory range 21" and can
only downgrade a sentence if it is "clearly convinced" that the
mitigating factors "substantially outweigh" the aggravating
ones. 2 14 When they are supported by a clear statement of reasons, 2 15 these determinations can be made with relative precision
and lend themselves to meaningful appellate review. 216 Appellate
courts, therefore, will be required to conduct a simple review of
the record to determine whether the evidence supports the trial
court's findings and whether such findings were made in accord207 Cf. Raymar, supra note 204, at 39 ("[s]tudies suggest general agreement
among persons from all segments of society upon groupings of crimes according to
their degrees of severity") (citations omitted). But cf. Bazelon, Missed Opportunitiesin
Sentencing Reform, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 57, 62-63 (1978) (infinite variety of possible
situations defies abstract categorization of defendants or offenses).
208 See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
209 See von Hirsch, supra note 71, at 30.
21o NewJersey's use of such factors is confined within the statutory ranges of N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a) and the strict standards of id. § 2C:44-1(f)(2). Cf. Hoffman & Stover, Reform in the Determination of Prison Terms: Equity, Determinacy, and the
Parole Release Function, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 89, 99 (1978) (broadly drawn determinations of mitigating and aggravating factors which may override presumptive sentence provide only minimal control over judicial discretion).
211 See supra notes 167 & 168 and accompanying text.
212 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a).
213 See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
214 See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
215 See N.J. CT. R. 3:29 (Pressler ed. 1985).
216 See Roth, 95 N.J. at 364, 471 A.2d at 387. The court identified the first two
prongs of appellate review of a criminal sentence as (1) a "review [of] the aggravating and mitigating factors found below to determine whether those factors were
based upon credible evidence in the record;" and (2) whether the correct sentencing guidelines or presumptions had been followed. Id.
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ance with the legislative guidelines.21 7
Unfortunately, the Code's standard for the most important
discretionary determination, the "in or out" decision, lacks the
precision of the standards governing the determinations previously discussed. Under that provision, the sentencing judge is
required to formulate an opinion as to whether "imprisonment
would be a serious injustice which overrides the need to deter
such conduct by others," based on "the character and condition
of the defendant.

' 21 8

In Roth, the court observed that this stan-

dard is met only in the exceptional case where it can be said that
"'the human cost of deterrence . . . is too great. ",219 Prior experience, however, has proven that such a nebulous standard
produces disparate results.22 Justifications for finding the type of
injustice necessary to meet this standard will be difficult to articulate and can be expected to foster a subspecies of the sentencing
disparity which the Code seeks to eliminate. 22 Similarly, the
court's retention of the Whitaker standard for appellate review 2- 2
a clear error ofjudgment which shocks the judicial conscience 2
lacks the precision necessary to alleviate disparity at the appellate level.
The Code's adoption of the modified deserts model for
criminal sentencing indicates that the Legislature did not go far
enough in the area of sentencing reform. 22 3 There is considerable agreement among commentators that certainty of punishment for all offenders is more important than the degree of
punishment meted out to individuals. 2 24 The promotion of cer-

tainty in sentencing under the just deserts model, however, does
not compel greater overall severity in punishment than that
Id. at 363, 471 A.2d at 386.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1(d).
Roth, 95 N.J. at 358, 471 A.2d at 383 (quoting State v. Harris, 70 N.J. 586,
596, 362 A.2d 32, 37 (1976)).
220 Compare State v. Velazquez, 54 NJ. 493, 257 A.2d 97 (1969) with State v. Harris, 70 NJ. 586, 362 A.2d 32 (1976).
221 See Raymar, supra note 204, at 47 ("Any attempt to add flexibility to a just
deserts system through consideration of an offender's characteristics would reintroduce the disparity and consequent unjustified deprivations of liberty [of the
past].").
222 See Roth, 95 N.J. at 364, 471 A.2d at 386 (citing State v. Whitaker, 79 NJ. 503,
512, 401 A.2d 509, 514 (1979)).
223 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1(d); see also Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and
ProsecutorialPower: A Critique of Recent Proposalsfor "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550, 563 (1978) ("The question today is probably how much
we should move in the direction of fixed sentences, not whether we should do
so.").
224 Raymar, supra note 204, at 37.
217
218
219
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which existed under the earlier principles. 2 2 5 A just deserts rationale seeks justice through its "[e]qual treatment of the equally
deserving and proportionate treatment of the unequally deserving."' 226 The offender-related standards retained in the Code's
presumptions of imprisonment and non-imprisonment will perpetuate the unequal treatment accorded different persons convicted of the same crime. Such disparity is neither necessary nor
inevitable. To the extent that statutes define crimes, they are capable of defining sentences. When the legislature shifts its focus
to the offense, notions of "individualized justice" necessarily give
way to society's need for a general deterrent based on certain
punishment. Retention, in the Code, of the vestiges of offenderoriented sentencing processes, therefore, hinders attempts to ensure uniform treatment in sentencing.
The New Jersey Legislature, in directing courts to focus on
the offense when sentencing, has expressed its intention that
criminal sanctions "fit the crime." It should, however, remain
true to its choice and eliminate all offender-related standards
from the Code's presumptive provisions. In the case of first and
second degree crimes, such a modification would increase the
certainty of punishment. Moreover, the Legislature should conduct a comprehensive review of the length of incarceration that it
deems appropriate for particular crimes. 2 2 ' These changes would
facilitate appellate review by eliminating the need to retain the
von Hirsch, supra note 109, at 778.
Id. at 786. The article included an analysis of the Minnesota sentencing commission model and stated that the commission emphatically did not recommend an
increase in the use of imprisonment. The commentator observed that
[t]he Commission adopted a principle of not increasing the aggregate
use of imprisonment, made projections of the estimated impact of various alternative guideline models on prison populations, and devised its
guidelines so as to comply with this limit. Rather than increasing the
overall reliance on imprisonment, the guidelines seek to reallocate its
use. Those convicted of serious crimes now normally have to go to
prison even if they are first offenders; but to compensate for this, imprisonment ceases to be the sanction of choice for lesser offenders, even when they have
criminal records.
Id. at 777-78 (emphasis added); cf. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1 (e) (restricts presumption of non-imprisonment to person "who has not previously been convicted of an
offense").
227 von Hirsch, supra note 109, at 778. The adoption of a just deserts model
requires implementation of the "parsimony principle." Such implementation
should occur at the rulemaking stage, where it would require that doubts as to the
severity of various crimes, and the degree of punishment the offenders presumptively deserve, should be resolved in favor of less punishment. Id.
225
226
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nebulous standard enunciated in Whitaker.2 28 Freeing the Code of
its offender-related standards, therefore, would fit the punishment to the crime and would promote a more "principled, evenhanded, effective and fair law of sentencing" in New Jersey.2 2 9
John P. MacPhee
228 See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Whitaker
standard.
229 Hodge, 95 N.J. at 380, 471 A.2d at 395.

